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RECENT CASES
taken for public use does not restrict the owner of the property to a :..'ecovery
of the market value.1s
In the instant case it will be observed that the court by applying the
"value to owner" or "value for use to which the property is being devoted"
rule, has departed from the standard employed by most jurisdictions.1' Even
so, irrespective of the measure of damages employed, the judiciary's primary
concern is that the owner of condemned property be awarded its actual value.
Consequently, while "market value" must be retained as the verbal rule of
compensation in order to preclude the possibility of awards based solely upon
sentiment and whim,17 it is emminently just that courts in order to insure full
compensation encourage the admission of evidence tending to show "special"
value in appropriate cases.
ORALL B. JOHNSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - EFFECT OF RACIALLY
RESTICTIVE DETERMINABLE FEE - A parcel of land was conveyed to plain-
tiff, a city park commission, upon the limitation, inter alia, that it be used as
a park only by persons of the white race. In a declaratory judgment action
brought by the commission for determination of the validity of the limitation.
the court held that the limitation was valid. If Negros used the park, the
determiable fee conveyed to the park commission would cease and terminate
by its own limitation, and the estate would automatically revert to 'the
grantor. The reversion would not operate by judicial enforcement and rights
of Negros under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights laws
would not be violated. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar-
ringer, 88 S.E.2d 114 (N. C. 1955).
The court reasoned that because of the automatic reversion there was no
state action within the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer., It therefore concluded
that the discriminatory nature of the limitation would fall outside the ban of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal civil rights laws on the theory
that an individual is free to discriminate as long as his acts are unsupported
by state action.
2
The North Carolina Court's employment of the concept of automatic re-
version to avoid the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer raises a greater problem than
it solves. If the happening of the limitation occurs, the title is in the grantor
and the possession in the grantee.3 If the grantor wishes to retake possession,
an action of ejectment is appropriate.4 But if the grantor brings ejectment, a
15. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1917).
16. The instant case was tried only on whether the constitutional provision justified the
charge to the jury as to the value to be placed on property condemned through eminent
domain and not as to whether the fact situation justified the charge. The case would
have been of much greater value had it also passed upon this point.
17. Housing Authority of City of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga.App. 485, 11 S.E.2d 418
(1940) (dissenting opinion) (Court stated that if instructions were not based on market
value the door would be opened to the wildest kind of speculation based upon the fancy
and whim of juries).
1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) Racial descriminations, such as the determinable fee in the
instant case, are merely wrongful acts of individuals and can remain outside the ban
of the Constitution only so long as they are unsupported by state authority.
2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); See Hale, Force and State, 35 Col.L.Rev.
149, 181 (1935).
3. Tiffany, Real Property, §217 (3d ed.) (1939).
4. Toth v. Bigelow, I N.J. 379, 64 A.2d 108 (1949).
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favorable decree would constitute discriminatory state action 5 and of necessity
would fall under the ban of Shelley v. Kraemer. Hence, conceeding his
right to possession, he would still be unable to obtain possession through
judicial process.
Self-help is the grantor's only other means of obtaining possession. How-
ever, if he goes upon the property to evict the possessor, his action must be
privileged.6 It will not be privileged unless he is entitled to immediate pos-
session,7 and in order to be so entitled, it is necessary that the right to pos-
session be one which can be enforced by legal proceedings. 8 As the grantor
cannot enforce any legal proceeding that would be contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 9 self-help is unavailable to him.
Although it was not argued in the instant case, it would seem that the
North Carolina Court's declaratory judgment deciding that the transpiring of
a discriminatory conditional limitation worked an automatic reversion which
would not fall under the constitutional prohibitions was in itself state action.
While it is true that no executory process follows a declaratory judgment,la
the court is nevertheless required to determine the question in controversy,"
and to issue a decree stating its position. The mere issuing a decree in a
declaratory judgment action is clearly a function of a court, 12 and as such, is
equally clearly state action.1 3
In the final analysis the rights of the citizens of a state find their existence
in the laws of the state. As individual rights to equal protection are estab-
lished by the law, so too must property rights find their sanction in the law.
A determinable fee does not operate automatically, aside and apart from the
law. It must necessarily gain its validity through the operation of the law,
1 4
and should not be permitted to operate contrary to paramount law.15 The
holding in the instant case defeats the spirit of Shelley v. Kraemer and opens
a new avenue through which Negros can be denied the protection from dis-
crimination which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended them
to have.l 6
PAUL PFEILSTICKER
5. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); accord, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
(1883); Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (1943). See also Ming, Racial Re-
strictions and the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 U.Chi.L.Rev. 203 (1949); McGovney,
Racial Residential Segregation by State- Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements,
Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 Calif.L.Rev. 5 (1945); Note 47,
Col.L.Rev. 76 (1947).
6. Restatement, Torts §88 (1934).
7. Id § 90.
8. Id § 90a.
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); accord, Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
Savings Co. .v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1880).
10. 28 USCA § 2201; Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
11. American Machine & Metals, Inc. v. DeBothezat Impeller Co., 166 F.2d 535
(2d Cir. 1948).
12. Douglas Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064 (Tex. 1935); See Village of Bay v.
Gelvick, 58 Ohio App. 51, 15 N.E.2d 786 (1937).
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); accord., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1880).
14. Onondaga Hotel Corp. v. Hunney, 62 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1946). "In a qualified fee,
the happening of the event is, in itself, the limit beyond which the estate no longer exists,
but it is terminated by operation of law . . ." See Lyon v. Husey, 103 N.Y. 264,
8 N.E. 520 (1886); Big Lake Oil Co. v. Reagan, 217 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1949).
15. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (Where the California Alien Land
Law was declared Unconstitutional as contrary to paramount law.)
16. Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917) (dictum); see also, Nixon v. Herdon,
273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (dictum).
